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Abstract
Background: On November 24th 2005, the Government of England and Wales removed regulatory restrictions on the times
at which licensed premises could sell alcohol. This study tests availability theory by treating the implementation of Licensing
Act (2003) as a natural experiment in alcohol policy.
Methods: An interrupted time series design was employed to estimate the Act’s immediate and delayed impact on violence
in the City of Manchester (Population 464,200). We collected police recorded rates of violence, robbery, and total crime
between the 1st of February 2004 and the 31st of December 2007. Events were aggregated by week, yielding a total of 204
observations (95 pre-, and 109 post-intervention). Secondary analysis examined changes in daily patterns of violence. Pre-
and post-intervention events were separated into four three-hour segments 18:00–20:59, 21:00–23.59, 00:00–02:59, 03:00–
05:59.
Results: Analysis found no evidence that the Licensing Act (2003) affected the overall volume of violence. However, analyses
of night-time violence found a gradual and permanent shift of weekend violence into later parts of the night. The results
estimated an initial increase of 27.5% between 03:00 to 06:00 (v= 0.2433, 95% CI = 0.06, 0.42), which increased to 36% by
the end of the study period (d=20.897, 95% CI =21.02, 20.77).
Conclusions: This study found no evidence that a national policy increasing the physical availability of alcohol affected the
overall volume of violence. There was, however, evidence suggesting that the policy may be associated with changes to
patterns of violence in the early morning (3 a.m. to 6 a.m.).
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Introduction
Violence and aggressive behaviour has a well established
association with alcohol consumption [1,2,3]. This relationship
has been shown to be causal in some laboratory settings [4], but in
the natural environment, alcohol-related violence is thought to be
mediated by a complex web of personality, cultural and situational
factors [5,6]. Throughout history, societies have developed
regulatory controls that restrict the times and places at which
alcohol can be sold, in an attempt to reduce social disorder [7].
These measures are consistent with ‘availability theory’, proposing
that the greater availability of alcohol in the population, the
greater the prevalence of problems stemming from alcohol
consumption [8]. In recent years, many western governments
have relaxed restrictions on the physical availability of alcohol [9]
and, in some cases, implemented policies that increase public
access to alcohol [10]. Sudden changes to regulations governing
when and where alcohol can be sold can provide a unique
opportunity to study the relationship between alcohol availability
and violence [11].
At the turn of the millennium, the growing prevalence of
alcohol related problems led to increased public and political
concern in England and Wales. A Government report estimated
the annual cost of alcohol related harm to exceed twenty billion
pounds, with 60% (£12 billion) being attributed to the costs of
alcohol-related crime and disorder [12]. At around the same time,
a Home Office White Paper (‘Time for Reform’) was published
recommending radical changes to regulatory framework governing
alcohol availability [13]. In 2003 these proposals were accepted
and formalised in The Licensing Act (2003) (hereafter ‘the Act’),
which was designed to release the leisure trade from unnecessary
bureaucracy, to instil a safer drinking culture, and to reduce crime
and disorder [14].
Contrary to traditional restrictive controls, the Act proposed to
reduce crime by removing restraints, rather than by adding them.
The rationale used to justify these changes evolved from three
reports observing overcrowding and other late-night bottlenecks
(e.g. at food outlets and taxi ranks) at fixed closing times (i.e. 23:00
and 02:00), which were believed to fuel violence and disorder
[15,16,17]. These reports suggested that removing fixed closing
times would help to stagger crowd dispersal from licensed
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premises, reducing violent behaviour as a consequence [14]. In
November 2005 the Act was implemented, removing restrictions
on trading hours for alcohol outlets, thus potentially increasing the
physical availability of alcohol. Under the principles of availability
theory, a significant increase in the availability of alcohol should
lead to increased rates of physical and social harm. This study uses
the Act as an opportunity to evaluate a government policy that
proposed to reduce violence by increasing the availability of
alcohol. To do this we examined whether and how trends in
violence changed in a large city in northern England after
implementation of the Act.
Effects of Increased On-premise Trading Hours on Violent
Crime: Previous Research
Several reviews have summarised the impact of changes to on-
premise trading hours on alcohol-related harm [10,18,19,20].
Overall, empirical evidence supporting the availability hypothesis
seems particularly strong for road traffic harm and excessive
alcohol consumption [19]. However, fewer studies have evaluated
the impact of extended trading hours on violent behaviour.
A recent study found only six studies evaluating the impact of
trading hour extensions on violent behaviour, some of which offer
support for the availability hypothesis [21]. In the same study,
researchers predicted a 17% increase in violent assault for every
one hour of extended opening in a sample of Norwegian cities
[21]. A study conducted in Australia found a statistically significant
increase in violent assault around premises with extended trading
permits [22], and a 31% increase in emergency room attendances
on weekends was observed in Iceland when restrictions on closing
hours were removed [23]. Alternatively, however, a British study
that examined the impact of a one hour extension in trading times
found no significant impact on reported violence [24]. On the
whole, the evidence from current reviews offers some support for
the hypothesis that increased hours of sale result in greater violent
harm, however the overall picture lacks consistency [21].
The review also included studies examining the impact of the
Licensing Act (2003) on violence [21]. However, their synthesis
included only three of the ten evaluations available to date. To
examine the results of the evidence in its entirety, we have
summarised all studies examining the impact of on-premise
availability extensions (see Table S1). Four studies found no
significant change to patterns of violence following the imple-
mentation of the Act [25,26,27,28]. In line with availability theory,
three studies reported statistically significant increases in violence
[29,30,31]. Conversely, three studies found reductions in violence,
contradicting availability theory (whilst offering partial support for
the Government rationale) [32,33,34]. In addition, several studies
found empirical evidence of changes to the hourly distribution of
violence in the post-intervention period. Consistent with findings
from international literature [20,22], these studies show patterns of
violence spreading later into the evening [26,27,31,33].
To date, there are no randomised controlled trials of changes to
licensed trading times, therefore the evidence base relies heavily on
opportunistic studies from several natural experiments around the
world. The lack of consistency within the literature may be
attributed to various methodological problems inherent within
complex alcohol policy evaluations [14,18,21]. These studies tend
to employ weak methodological designs that lack suitable control
conditions. Even in cases where comparison conditions have been
incorporated, the proximity of treatment and control areas make
contamination a problem. Furthermore, many studies are
retrospective and therefore unable to conduct process evaluations
detailing the implementation of new measures. Until now, only
two studies have employed more robust non-randomised designs
such as interrupted time series modelling, neither of which were
applied to the Licensing Act [21,22]. In the absence of pro-
spectively designed randomised control studies, more robust
nonrandomised studies are required to help generate evidence.
Materials and Methods
Design
We treated the removal of trading hour restrictions that resulted
from the Act as a natural experiment in order to test two
competing hypotheses: first, that flexible trading hours would lead
to a reduction in levels of violence (as predicted by the Labour
Government [13]); and secondly, that flexible trading hours would
increase levels of violence (as predicted by availability theory [8]).
Each hypothesis was tested using an interrupted time series (ITS)
design, which has been recommended as a suitable evaluation
design in cases where it is difficult to find appropriate control
conditions [11,35,36,37,38]. Using a period of time as the unit of
analysis, ITS designs use multiple measures of a pre- and post-
intervention outcome variable to estimate intervention effects.
We obtained recorded crime incident data from Greater
Manchester Police between 1st of February 2004 to the 31st of
December 2007. In order to generate measures comparable to
other evaluations [25,27,28,39], we recoded crime into categories
defined by the 2008 Home Office counting rules [40]. The data
included detailed information on the date and time of the incident,
which made it possible to aggregate ‘violence against the person’ to
weekly units; this was used as the primary dependent variable. The
long study period enabled us to generate a series of 204 weekly
time points (95 pre- and 109 post-intervention), which exceed
minimum recommended sample size (i.e 50 observational units)
for ARIMA impacts assessments [36,41,42]. We separated our
analyses by weekday (Sunday 12:00 p.m. to Friday 11:59 a.m.)
and weekends (Friday 12:00 p.m. to Sunday 11:59 a.m.) due to
well known differences in routine patterns of public alcohol
consumption [43,44]. Furthermore, in order to examine changes
to the temporal distribution of violence we performed separate
analyses on individual time segments. We separatedq night-time
hours into four segments: 18:00–20:59, 21:00–23.59, 00:00–02:59,
03:00–05:59.
A common limitation of natural experimental studies is the
failure to construct plausible counterfactual conditions, thus
making it difficult to take account of historical confounding
factors [45]. This is a problem common to studies examining
policy interventions which are implemented simultaneously across
a population [35]. A partial solution to this problem is to include
non-equivalent dependent variables [35,46,47]–variables not
expected to respond to the intervention, but exposed to the same
historical validity threats [45]. In this study we used two non-
equivalent variables to control for confounding factors, these were:
robbery, and total crime. Although it is possible that many types of
criminal behaviour could be associated with alcohol consumption,
studies of drug use in English and Welsh arrestees calculated
attribution fractions for alcohol in robbery (13%) and total crime
(22%), which were far lower than for violence (37%) [48]. To our
knowledge there is no evidence that robbery or total crime rates
are associated with changes in closing hours to the same extent as
violent assault. Variations in these types of crime are therefore less
likely to change as a result of the Act, but are potentially
responsive to cyclical factors that may confound the Act’s impact
on violence. The annual frequencies for these variables are
presented in Table 1.
In an attempt to identify any confounding events occurring
during the study period that might serve as plausible alternative
Flexible Alcohol Trading Hours and Violence
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explanations for our findings [35,49] (i.e. historical threats to
validity), we researched local events that occurred between 2004
and 2008 and found two such factors. The first was the Smoking
Ban of 2007, which prohibited smoking within licensed premises,
causing individuals to crowd in streets. The second was a series of
short-term Alcohol Misuse Enforcement Campaigns (AMECs),
during which extra police and local authority enforcement
resources targeted alcohol related disorder. Each was included
within our analytical structure.
Statistical Analysis
We tested our hypothesis using interrupted autoregressive
integrated moving average (ARIMA) models [37,38,50]. For each
time series, conventional methods were used to identify the nature
of the time series. Logarithmic transformations and differencing
was applied when necessary to achieve time series that were
normally distributed and stationary in level and variance.
Autocorrelation functions (ACF) and partial autocorrelation
functions (PACF) of the time series and of the residuals from each
ARIMA model were used to identify evidence of seasonality and to
test model fit.
Transfer functions were then incorporated into the ARIMA
models to perform the impact assessment component of the
analysis. Each time series was modelled using three types of
transfer functions to test for evidence that the date of the licensing
act was associated with either an abrupt permanent, a gradual
permanent, or an abrupt but temporary impact on violence (or
other crime) [37,38]. We used this strategy because a process
evaluation (reported elsewhere, [14]) found considerable variation
in the application of extended trading hours across the study area.
These analyses found that most (63%) premises changed their
hours of trade on the implementation date. However, a smaller
proportion (15.6%) changed trading times throughout the post-
implementation period, potentially delaying the onset of effects.
Due to this, the Act’s effect could be abrupt or gradual, and
therefore it was necessary to estimate each of the transfer functions
to determine the most accurate model.
The implementation of the Act, which was introduced at week
96 of the study period (November 24th, 2005), was represented as
a dummy variable (or step function) coded 0 through week 95 and 1
thereafter. As recommended in other studies [37,51], we also
modelled the intervention onset for the 95th and 97th weeks to
account for time that might have elapsed before practices were
changed. For brevity, these models are only reported where
significant effects are detected.
The possibility that the Act had an abrupt, permanent effect (1.1)
was tested using a zero-order transfer function
LnYt~v0ItzNt ð1:1Þ
The zero-order transfer function estimates the impact (v) at the
onset of the intervention. Therefore, if the Act had an abrupt one-
dimensional effect, the zero-order transfer function would be an
adequate model. However, it may be the case that although
trading hour restrictions were lifted instantly following the Act’s
implementation, intervention effects may not have been immedi-
ately observable. Because it is not clear that an abrupt permanent
effect should be expected, two additional transfer functions were
used to explore alternatives.
The first-order transfer function was used to model each
intervention as if the effect of the Act on violence or crime was
gradual, permanent (1.2):
LnYt~
v0
1{d1B
It ð1:2Þ
This model estimates the change at onset (v) as well as a rate
value (d) enabling the identification of dynamic impacts. Using the
rate parameter, the asymptotic change (v/12d) can be calculated
(i.e. the magnitude of change at the end of the study period). The
rate parameter (d) alone indicates how quickly the overall change
was achieved. A value of zero means change was achieved
instantly following the onset of an intervention; a value of 1
indicates that the impact was diffused slowly throughout the study
period.
As the third alternative for each time series, the Act was
modelled as a first-order transfer function applied to a differenced
(pulse) intervention variable, thereby testing for the possibility of
an abrupt, temporary (1.3) effect:
LnY t~
v0
1{d1B
1{Bð ÞIt ð1:3Þ
Results
General Trends
Table 1 reports the incidence of violence, robbery, and total
crime annually over the four-year study period. The weekly
time series of violence shown in Figure 1(a) does not reveal any
visual evidence of a distinct disruption to the violence trend
following the implementation of the Act in November 2005.
When subjected to more rigorous impact assessment, the
ARIMA results presented in Table 2 confirm an absence of
any significant effects. Estimates using a zero-order transfer
function found a non-significant increase of 12% (v=0.781,
95% CI=20.06, 0.17) in violence at the onset of the
intervention period (percent changes are calculated using (evzt
–1)100). Furthermore, there was no evidence of a gradual-
permanent, or abrupt-temporary effect from models (b) and (c).
Table 1. Crime frequencies (2004–2007).
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
N % N % N % N % N %
Violence 12744 15.2 13611 15.2 14823 15.9 13338 16 54516 15.6
Robbery 3425 4.1 3505 3.9 3801 4.1 3365 4 14096 4
Total crime 83692 100 89461 100 93106 100 83316 100 349575 100
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055581.t001
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In these analyses and also in the analyses reported below,
parameter estimates derived through maximum likelihood and
exact algorithms were indistinguishable.
We extended the search for possible omitted control variables
by analysing the impact of the Act on crimes for which it was not
expected to have an impact. This is an important validation step as
Figure 1. General Crime Trends.Weekly trends in (A) violence, (B) robbery, and (C) total crime, between 2004 and 2008 in the City of Manchester.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055581.g001
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it examines whether some unobserved third variable might have
operated on crimes other than violence, hence masking the effect
of the intervention. However, Figure 1 (B–C) and Table 3 reveal
no evidence of any external shock having an impacted on total
crime (20.09%, v=0.001, 95% CI=20.05, 0.05), or robbery
(28%, v=20.084, 95% CI=20.21, 0.04).
Then, to extend the analysis of the time series of violence, we
incorporated two policy interventions that may confound the
estimation of the Act’s impact: the smoking ban, and a series of
AMECs. The smoking ban was entered into the model as a step
variable, whereas the AMECs were entered as a series of pulse
variables occurring throughout the pre- and post-implementation
period. These policy changes occurred close to the change in
opening hours. Their omission could therefore bias the estimation
of the intervention effects in question. When added to the violence
model, neither of these variables were associated with changes to
violence (or other crime), and the introduction of these variables
had no impact on the model estimates. Similarly, no changes to
model estimates occurred when these variables were introduced to
the models for total crime, robbery, or criminal damage.
Impact on Late Night Patterns of Violence
A number of previous studies found evidence of increased
violence later in the evening, which could have numerous
implications for services that provide support for the night-time
economy (i.e. police, emergency services, transport)
[22,26,27,31,33]. In these analyses the aim was to evaluate
whether more subtle changes to night-time patterns of violence
Table 2. ARIMA Interrupted Time Series Parameter Estimates (General Trends).
95%
Confidence
Interval
ARIMA Model Parameter Estimate SE Lower Upper T-ratio
Ln Violence a) Zero-Order Transfer Function 0,1,1 MA (1) 0.781 0.043 0.70 0.86 18.30
(abrupt-permanent effects) v Licensing Act 0.114 0.027 20.06 0.17 0.43
v AMEC 20.010 0.011 20.03 0.01 20.88
v Smoking ban 0.010 0.028 20.05 0.07 0.37
b) First-Order Transfer Function (Step) 0,1,1 MA (1) 0.780 0.046 0.69 0.87 17.03
(Gradual-permanent effects) v Licensing Act 0.007 0.043 20.08 0.09 0.17
d Licensing Act 0.518 0.327 20.12 1.16 0.16
v AMEC 20.010 0.011 20.03 0.01 20.87
v Smoking ban 0.010 0.029 20.05 0.07 0.35
c) First-Order Transfer Function (Pulse) 0,1,1 MA (1) 0.785 0.045 0.70 0.87 17.36
(Abrupt-temporary effects) v Licensing Act 0.000 0.023 20.04 0.04 0.02
d Licensing Act 0.486 1.635 22.72 3.69 0.30
v AMEC 20.009 0.011 20.03 0.01 20.85
v Smoking ban 0.011 0.028 20.04 0.07 0.38
Ln Total Crime a) Zero-Order Transfer Function 1,1,0 AR(1) 20.450 0.064 20.58 20.32 26.98
v Licensing Act 20.001 0.026 20.05 0.05 20.04
b) First-Order Transfer Function (Step) 1,1,0 AR(1) 20.608 0.066 20.74 20.48 29.27
v Licensing Act 0.000 0.014 20.03 0.03 20.02
d Licensing Act 20.999 1.609 24.15 2.16 20.62
c) First-Order Transfer Function (Pulse) 1,1,0 AR(1) 20.608 0.066 20.74 20.48 29.27
v Licensing Act 0.000 0.014 20.03 0.03 20.02
d Licensing Act 20.999 1.609 24.15 2.16 20.62
Ln Robbery a) Zero-Order Transfer Function 2,1,0 AR(1) 20.628 0.062 20.75 20.51 210.16
AR(2) 20.372 0.075 20.52 20.23 24.98
v Licensing Act 20.084 0.064 20.21 0.04 21.32
b) First-Order Transfer Function (Step) 2,1,0 AR(1) 20.617 0.063 20.74 20.49 29.75
AR(2) 20.360 0.075 20.51 20.21 24.77
v Licensing Act 20.037 0.075 20.18 0.11 20.05
d Licensing Act 20.956 0.550 22.03 0.12 21.74
c) First-Order Transfer Function (Pulse) 2,1,0 AR(1) 20.611 0.063 20.73 20.49 29.69
AR(2) 20.358 0.075 20.51 20.21 24.76
v Licensing Act 20.008 0.024 20.06 0.04 20.32
d Licensing Act 20.978 0.111 21.20 20.76 28.81
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055581.t002
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were observable following the Act’s implementation. This was
done by disaggregating night-time patterns of violence into smaller
three-hour segments, and conducting ARIMA intervention
analysis for each segment.
The results are presented in Table 3 and Figure 2. For
weekdays, ARIMA modelling found no significant changes to
violence throughout the evening, and therefore we have not
tabulated these results. The findings for weekends are largely
supportive of the previous findings and show no statistically
significant changes in violence between 6 p.m. and 3 a.m.
However, consistent with several other evaluations [26,27,31],
Table 3. ARIMA Interrupted Time Series Parameter Estimates (Analysis of Night-Time Patterns of Weekend Violence).
95%
Confidence
Interval
ARIMA
Model Parameter Estimate SE Lower Upper T-ratio
Ln Violence 18:00–20:59 a) Zero-Order Transfer Function 4,1,0 AR(1) 20.823 0.0467 20.915 20.731 217.61
AR(2) 20.6123 0.0703 20.750 20.475 28.70
AR(4) 20.3710 0.0846 20.537 20.205 24.38
v Licensing Act 20.1254 0.1039 20.329 0.078 21.21
b) First-Order Transfer Function (Step) 4,1,0 AR(1) 20.8171 0.0500 20.915 20.719 216.35
AR(2) 20.6150 0.0729 20.758 20.472 28.43
AR(4) 20.3653 0.0883 20.538 20.192 24.14
v Licensing Act 20.2205 0.1457 20.506 0.065 21.51
d Licensing Act 20.7179 0.518 21.733 0.297 21.39
c) First-Order Transfer Function (Pulse) 4,1,0 AR(1) 20.8157 0.0497 20.913 20.718 216.4
AR(2) 20.6115 0.0723 20.753 20.470 28.46
AR(4) 20.3655 0.0876 20.537 20.194 24.17
v Licensing Act 20.1718 0.1463 20.459 0.115 21.17
d Licensing Act 20.4496 0.4994 21.428 0.529 20.9
Ln Violence 21:00–23.59 a) Zero-Order Transfer Function 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.8834 0.0324 0.820 0.947 27.3
v Licensing Act 0.0352 0.0593 20.081 0.151 0.59
b) First-Order Transfer Function (Step) 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.8779 0.0336 0.812 0.944 26.14
v Licensing Act 0.0194 0.0890 20.155 0.194 0.22
d Licensing Act 20.2375 5.3693 210.761 10.286 20.04
c) First-Order Transfer Function (Pulse) 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.8765 0.0334 0.811 0.942 26.24
v Licensing Act 0.0044 0.1029 20.197 0.206 0.04
d Licensing Act 20.8617 10.7467 221.925 20.202 20.08
Ln Violence 00:00–02:59 a) Zero-Order Transfer Function 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.8625 0.0342 0.795 0.930 25.24
v Licensing Act 0.0369 0.0481 20.057 0.131 0.77
b) First-Order Transfer Function (Step) 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.8694 0.0324 0.806 0.933 26.84
v Licensing Act 0.0404 0.0882 20.132 0.213 0.46
d Licensing Act 20.1997 5.3163 210.620 10.220 20.04
c) First-Order Transfer Function (Pulse) 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.8694 0.0324 0.806 0.933 26.8
v Licensing Act 0.0404 0.0882 20.132 0.213 0.46
d Licensing Act 20.1997 5.3163 210.620 10.220 20.04
Ln Violence 03:00–05:59 a) Zero-Order Transfer Function 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.9591 0.0240 0.912 1.006 39.46
v Licensing Act 0.0863 0.0623 20.036 0.208 1.39
b) First-Order Transfer Function (Step)1 0,1,9 MA(1) 0.8779 0.0336 0.812 0.944 26.14
MA(2) 20.2944 0.0174 20.329 20.260 56.08
v Licensing Act 0.2433 0.0897 0.067 0.419 2.71
d Licensing Act 20.897 0.0634 21.021 20.773 214.14
c) First-Order Transfer Function (Pulse) 0,1,1 MA(1) 0.9276 0.0254 0.878 0.977 36.5
v Licensing Act 0.1312 0.1511 20.165 0.427 0.87
d Licensing Act 0.4244 0.6384 20.827 1.676 0.66
1Effects shown here were found when the onset of the intervention was lagged 1 week.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055581.t003
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we found a statistically significant increase in early morning
violence between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m.
Specifically, Figure 2(A) shows a series of spikes in the weeks
immediately after the Act’s implementation, followed by a subtle
increase in the average level of violence. The apparent increase is
confirmed in Table 3, where the model for a first-order transfer
function shows a significant gradual and permanent impact on
violence. The results estimate an initial increase of 27.5%
(v=0.2433, 95% CI= 0.06, 0.42) at the onset of the intervention.
However, the asymptotic change parameter shows that the level of
violence continues to increase to a logged rate of 2.36 (asymptotic
change =v/(12d))–a 36% increase overall. The significant rate
parameter (d=20.897, 95% CI=21.02, 20.77) indicates that
the asymptotic level of violence was reached gradually during the
post-implementation period. Specifically, this suggests that an
increase of 36% overall would predict that the implementation of
the Act was ultimately responsible for an additional 3 violent
incidents per week between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m. A graph depicting
the rate of the impact is presented in Figure 2 (B), showing that the
impact was much steeper in the initial weeks following the
implementation, but remained significantly higher than pre-
implementation levels thereafter.
Discussion
This study used a natural experimental design to analyse the
impact of the removal of trading restrictions on violent behaviour
in the City of Manchester. Consistent with other evaluations
[26,27,28,29,39], our findings show no significant changes to the
overall level of violence following the implementation of the
Licensing Act (2003). Analysis of night-time violence found
evidence of a statistically significant 36% increase in violence
between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m. These findings add to a growing body
of evidence showing that extensions in hourly sales of alcohol may
contribute to small yet meaningful changes in late night violence.
These findings also suggested that the Act’s impact was not
abrupt, but gradual and permanent. The validity of this finding is
strengthened when we consider the findings of a previous study
[14] which showed that the Act’s implementation followed
a pattern of diffusion similar to that shown in Figure 2(b). Taken
together, these findings offer further evidence to reject the
government-proposed hypothesis that removing restrictions on
trading times would lead to decreased levels of violence. Whilst
critics of the Act will argue that the absence of reduced violence is
unsurprising in light of the extensive literature associating
availability to increased harm [21,22], it is somewhat surprising
that greater increases in violence were not observed in this or several
other evaluations of the Act (Table S1). Such counterintuitive
findings should prompt further investigation of why greater
alcohol availability leads to increased violence in some contexts
and not in others [52].
Like other studies evaluating the impact of the Licensing Act,
this study has a number of strengths and limitations. The ARIMA
Figure 2. Effect on Weekend Violence (3 a.m. to 6 a.m.). Weekly trends in (A) violence between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m., and (B) the proportion of
asymptotic change in violence in the post-intervention period.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055581.g002
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model approach is arguably a more rigorous method of assessing
policy impact than other approaches that have evaluated the Act
to date. In this study we explicitly modelled other policy changes
that we believe could have had an impact on violence rates during
the study period, although it possible that unknown and un-
measured confounding may still exist. We also investigated
potential model misspecification by examining whether any
change occurred in crime indicators where no impact of the
Licensing Act was to be expected. In the absence of overall effects,
we also investigated whether more subtle changes to night-time
violence were evident. Unlike many previous evaluations, this
study was adequately powered to estimate immediate and delayed
impacts of the Act.
Power was enhanced in our study by using time series
aggregated by week. Relative to monthly time series that we
created for comparison to explore this issue, the weekly time series
reported above had proportionately better model fits and, hence,
supported more powerful hypothesis tests. For example, whereas
our weekly time series of late-night violence (3 a.m. to 6 a.m.)
suggested that the Act had a gradual permanent impact as
evidenced by statistically significant parameter estimates for the
transfer function (Table 3), a monthly aggregation of the same
data yielded a statistically significant denominator estimate but
a numerator estimate that was small in comparison (v=0.0475)
and included the null value (95% CI=20.07, 0.12). Also the Q
statistic, used to gauge model residuals for randomness at 24 lags,
was 18.1 for the monthly time series but 12.0 for the weekly time
series. Ultimately then, reliance on monthly data would have led to
a different, less defensible conclusion.
The reliance on police-recorded crime data means that these
results are susceptible to the ‘dark figure’ of unreported crime
[53,54]. In order to address this, it would have been desirable to
supplement the data with injury records from accident and
emergency departments, but these data were unavailable.
Furthermore, these analyses investigate the impact of extended
trading on a macro-level and do not attempt to isolate the
relationship between changes to closing times and changes to local
rates of violence. As previous studies have shown [55], the
implementation of the extended trading hours differed across
cities, meaning that smaller geographic units are likely to have
experienced different doses of the intervention. It is conceivable
that violence increased (or decreased) in areas where extended
trading increased, and reduced in areas where trading contracted,
thus averaging out effects when examined at the macro level.
A further limitation of this study is its generalisability. Under
ideal circumstances, it would have been desirable to design
a prospective multisite study, collecting detailed population data
on alcohol consumption patterns, licensed trading times and both
self-reported and recorded rates of violence and injury. However,
given the nature of the Act’s implementation [14], the consider-
able resources this would require, and the lack of detailed routine
data, such a design was deemed infeasible. Complex policy
interventions like this are rarely able to deal with all threats to
external validity [36], and in many cases, generalisable causal
inference will rely on the replication of natural experiments and
the synthesis of this combined evidence [56]. By increasing
attention to the rigor and internal validity of this evaluation, this
study provides further evidence that the Act failed to reduce
violence (as was suggested by the Labour government), and may
have contributed to additional problems by spreading violence
later into the early hours of the morning.
The findings from this and other evaluations of the Act have
implications both for policymakers and the research community.
These findings serve as a reminder that preventive policy may not
always have its anticipated affect on behaviour, and when
conceived without proper attention to available scientific evidence,
may even cause harmful side effects. These findings suggest some
evidence of negative side effects on early morning violence
resulting from the Act’s implementation. However, we still know
very little about whether an absence of dramatic effects on overall
violence is evident in other alcohol-related harms. Future research
needs to move beyond black-box evaluative designs by in-
vestigating the impact of policy on exposure (e.g. alcohol
availability) as well as the impact of exposure on multiple
indicators of physical and social harm. In England and Wales,
a vast improvement in the provision of routine data on alcohol
availability and consumption is required to further our un-
derstanding of the relationship between alcohol availability,
alcohol misuse and its related harms.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Summary of Evaluations of Extended Trading.
This table provides a summary of the findings of 13 evaluations of
interventions extending the availability of alcohol.
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